Subadult ravens generally don't transfer valuable tokens to conspecifics when there is nothing to gain for themselves by Jorg J. M. Massen et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 30 June 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00885
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 885
Edited by:
Elsa Addessi,
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche,
Italy
Reviewed by:
Valérie Dufour,
Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, France
Judith M. Burkart,
University of Zurich, Switzerland
*Correspondence:
Jorg J. M. Massen,
Department of Cognitive Biology,
University of Vienna, Althanstrasse 14,
1090 Wien, Austria
jorgmassen@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Comparative Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 15 March 2015
Accepted: 15 June 2015
Published: 30 June 2015
Citation:
Massen JJM, Lambert M, SchiestlM
and Bugnyar T (2015) Subadult
ravens generally don’t transfer
valuable tokens to conspecifics when
there is nothing to gain for
themselves. Front. Psychol. 6:885.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00885
Subadult ravens generally don’t
transfer valuable tokens to
conspecifics when there is nothing to
gain for themselves
Jorg J. M. Massen 1*, Megan Lambert 2, Martina Schiestl 1, 3 and Thomas Bugnyar 1, 3
1Department of Cognitive Biology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 2Department of Psychology, University of York, York,
UK, 3Haidlhof Research Station, University of Vienna and University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Austria
The extent to which humans help each other is extraordinary in itself, and difficult to
explain from an evolutionary perspective. Therefore, there has been a recent surge in
studies investigating the evolution of prosocial behavior using a comparative approach.
Nevertheless, most of these studies have focused on primates only, and little is known
about other animal orders. In a previous study, common ravens (Corvus corax) have been
shown to be indifferent to the gains of conspecifics. However, this may have been due
to the experimental set-up, as many studies that use different set-ups report conflicting
results within the same species. We therefore tested ravens’ prosocial tendencies in a
different set-up; i.e., we tested whether sub-adult ravens would transfer a token to a
partner and, thereby, provide the partner with the opportunity to exchange a token for
a reward. To control and test for effects of partner identity, we tested eight individuals
both in a dyadic and in a group setting. Our results show that in general the ravens in our
experiment did not show other-regarding preferences. However, some acts of helping did
occur spontaneously. We discuss what could be the causes for those sporadic instances,
and why in general prosocial tendencies were found to be almost lacking among the
ravens in this set-up.
Keywords: prosociality, other-regard, ravens, altruism, cooperation
Introduction
Recently, socio-ecological studies of behavior have shifted their focus from “selfish” behaviors
to those considered to be more altruistic (Silk and House, 2011). These altruistic behaviors are
particularly interesting from an evolutionary perspective, as they are likely to increase the recipient’s
fitness at a cost to the actor (de Waal, 2008). The associated costs of altruisms can be overcome by
kin-selection (Hamilton, 1964), or through reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). However, both explanations
are at the ultimate level, and do not provide insight into the proximate motivations underlying this
behavior (Tinbergen, 1963). Nevertheless, humans show a wide array of altruistic acts also toward
non-kin (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), including prosocial behavior, which may be defined as
“behavior that benefits others at no or low cost to the actor” (Silk and House, 2011). Consequently,
there has been a surge in studies investigating the evolution of such behavior either through models
(e.g., de Vos et al., 2001; Boyd et al., 2010; Forber and Smead, 2014) or by comparing our behavior
with that of other primates.
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The first experimental evidence for prosocial preferences in
non-humans was documented in commonmarmosets (Callithrix
jacchus: Burkart et al., 2007). Like humans, common marmosets
are characterized by a cooperative breeding system in which
several individuals will contribute to the care of offspring that are
often not their own, or that are not even related to themselves
(Burkart et al., 2009; Hrdy, 2009). As providing food to non-
relatives obviously requires some sort of prosocial tendency,
it was hypothesized that prosocial behavior had evolved as
a consequence of this socio-ecological adaptation (i.e., the
Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis, Burkart et al., 2007, 2009).
Corroborating this hypothesis, a recent study on 15 primate
species showed that the degree of allomaternal care per species
predicts group provisioning by a single individual of that
species (Burkart et al., 2014). Nevertheless, prosocial behavior
has, albeit to a lesser degree than in humans and marmosets,
also been experimentally shown in many other primate species
(brown capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella: de Waal et al., 2008;
long-tailed macaques, Macaca fascicularis: Massen et al., 2010;
cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus: Cronin et al., 2010;
bonobos, Pan paniscus: Hare and Kwetuenda, 2010; chimpanzees,
Pan troglodytes: Horner et al., 2011; and orang-utans, Pongo
pygmaeus: Liebal et al., 2014) including many that do not breed
cooperatively. This suggests that all primates may share at least
a basic tendency for pro-sociality through common ancestry,
and little can be said about the evolutionary pressures that
led to the evolution of this behavior in this common ancestor.
Comparisons with non-primate species thus seem warranted (see
also Thornton and McAuliffe, 2015).
Among birds, the corvid family shares several socio-ecological
characteristics with primates (Emery, 2006) that seem to have
led to similar cognitive capacities (Emery and Clayton, 2004).
In a recent study, Schwab et al. (2012) showed that jackdaws,
Corvus monedula, can behave prosocially in an experimental set-
up, although only when the recipient shows particular interest
in the reward. Intriguingly, however, the closely related common
raven did not demonstrate such preferences in a similar set-up
(Di Lascio et al., 2013). This deviation between two closely related
species might highlight important socio-ecological differences
that may help explain the evolution of prosociality. For example,
jackdaws may breed in colonies (Johnsson, 1994), whereas ravens
exclusively breed in territorial pairs (Heinrich, 1999). Although
the jackdaws do not show allo-parental care, their openness to
communal breeding does require more intraspecific tolerance
than the territorial ravens, which may have led to the evolution
of more pronounced prosocial tendencies (cf. Burkart et al.,
2014). Alternatively, this deviation may result frommethodology
(Tan et al., 2015). For example, several studies on chimpanzees
and one on bonobos failed to show prosociality in our closest
living relatives when using a two-choice paradigm featuring
visible food rewards (Silk et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2006; Vonk
et al., 2008; Amici et al., 2014; Tan et al., 2015), whereas others
readily demonstrated prosociality in chimpanzees and bonobos
using either a helping task (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006;
Warneken et al., 2007; Yamamoto et al., 2009, 2012; Hare and
Kwetuenda, 2010; Greenberg et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 2011;
Melis et al., 2011; Tan and Hare, 2013), or a slightly adapted
two-choice paradigm that uses tokens as a means to retrieve
rewards through an exchange with an experimenter (Horner
et al., 2011, but see Amici et al., 2014). Similarly, in human
studies results are conflicting; for example, slight adaptations to
the popular public-goods game have resulted in a breakdown of
cooperative behavior, leading scientists to question the prosocial
nature of humans in general (Kümmerli et al., 2010; Burton-
Chellew and West, 2013). In addition, pro-sociality in children
has been shown to be rather unstable at a young age (Li et al.,
2013), and conflicting results have been found with different set-
ups (Burkart and Rueth, 2013). Most of this inconsistency has
been attributed to differences in the attentional and cognitive
demands of the different tasks (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006;
Horner et al., 2011; Burkart and Rueth, 2013; Amici et al., 2014;
House et al., 2014).
Therefore, we re-examined prosocial preferences of common
ravens using a different set-up than the prosocial choice task of
Di Lascio et al. (2013). In particular, in the current study we
tested eight subadult ravens in a helping task; i.e., we tested their
willingness to offer a conspecific a token, which, in contrast to the
actor itself, the recipient could exchange for a food reward with
an experimenter (cf. Dufour et al., 2009; Pelé et al., 2009). We
chose to use subadult subjects since subadult ravens in the wild
live in complex social flocks, and form strong and stable social
bonds (not only with future pair-mates) (Fraser and Bugnyar,
2010). Moreover, subadult ravens are known to show and offer
each other objects in their everyday life (Pika and Bugnyar, 2011),
making the setup we use possibly more intuitive for the ravens
than the set-up of Di Lascio et al. (2013).
Our set-up allowed to investigate whether the behavior of
the partner in the test, the identity of the tested individual
and the composition of the dyad could predict whether an
individual would offer a conspecific a token or not. The
behavior of recipients has been shown to both positively as well
as negatively influence the pro-social choices of subject; e.g.,
whereas direct requests or harassment of recipients decreased
prosocial preferences of chimpanzees (Horner et al., 2011), when
the recipient only showed interest this did increased prosocial
preferences in the same study (Horner et al., 2011) and also in
a study on jackdaws (Schwab et al., 2012). Similarly, the identity
of the subject and the composition of the dyad could influence
a subject’s tendency to choose prosocially in an experiment. For
example high ranking long-tailed macaques,Macaca fascicularis,
are pro-social, whereas low ranking ones are a-social (Massen
et al., 2010). However, the latter ones choose to be prosocial
toward the highest ranking of two potential recipients (Massen
et al., 2011). For a detailed overview of potential factors
influencing prosociality and the results on different species so far,
see Cronin (2012).
Our study consisted of two experimental settings: in
Experiment 1, we paired each individual with a fixed partner,
whereas in Experiment 2 the actor could potentially choose
its own recipient, while the whole social group was present.
Moreover, in Experiment 2 we tested whether, if the ravens
would be prosocial in our tests, they would also forego a
reward themselves to provide one to another, showing costly
pro-sociality (cf. Sterck et al., 2015).
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Methods
Subjects, Housing, and Ethics
Experiment 1 was conducted between February 2013 and July
2013, and Experiment 2 between April 2014 and June 2014. We
tested eight subadult captive ravens consisting of 5 males and
3 females that were around 1 year old at the time when we
conducted Experiment 1. All were housed in one social group
containing 10 birds in total at the Haidlhof Research Station, Bad
Vöslau, Austria. All ravens from this groupwere born in 2012 and
originated from four captive breeding pairs in zoos (Zoo Wels,
Austria; Tierpark Haag, Austria; Nationalpark Bayrischer Wald,
Germany; Spanga, Stockholm, Sweden). All birds were hand-
raised identically in one cohort by several researchers, including
authors of this paper. In 2013, when we conducted Experiment
1, the group lived in a large outdoor aviary (12 × 9× 5m) with
access to two adjacent roofed experimental compartments (each
3 × 4× 5m), where the experiment was conducted. In 2014,
the group was moved to a larger outdoor aviary (15 × 15×
5m), which could be split in 3 compartments for the sake of
Experiment 2 (see experimental procedure below). During the
whole period the birds were fed a diverse diet containing meat,
milk products, bread, vegetables, and fruits twice a day, and
feeding protocols remained the same on testing days. In each
aviary and testing compartment the birds had ad libitum access
to water. All birds participated voluntarily in the experiments.
Due to the non-invasive character of the experiments, the study
complied with Austrian law and was authorized by the ethical
board of the behavioral research group at the faculty of Life
sciences, University of Vienna (case number: 2015-003). After the
study the birds remained in captivity at the Haidlhof Research
Station.
Training
In the 3 months prior to Experiment 1 the subjects were trained
to be isolated from the group in a testing compartment, and to
exchange tokens (red plastic bottle tops) with an experimenter
for rewards [pieces of frolic R© (dog-food)]. Exchanging was
shaped using positive reinforcement both with treats and verbal
praise. After the birds had learned to directly exchange with an
experimenter, they were trained to exchange through the fence
of the test compartments and aviaries, and only at the site where
a small red table was placed outside. Subsequently, the subjects
were allowed to move freely between two test compartments,
and were provided with 10 tokens in one compartment, while
the red table was placed in front of the other compartment, and
thus had to walk back and forth between the two compartments
to exchange all tokens. When a subject managed to successfully
exchange all 10 tokens within 10min in 4 consecutive trials
(in which the two test compartments were counterbalanced per
individual), it proceeded to testing in Experiment 1.
Note that the ravens were never trained to transfer a token
through the wire mesh in the door in between the two test
compartments in Experiment 1, nor through the wire mesh
between the compartments in Experiment 2. Thus, the animals
learned only the procedure we used in both experiments, but not
the response we measured.
Experimental Procedure and Test Conditions
Experiment 1
For Experiment 1 we selected fixed subject–partner dyads from
the participating individuals from our group. We assumed
that prosociality would be more prevalent among, or perhaps
exclusive to, close social bonds. We therefore tried to select dyads
with the best possible relationships, while also balancing dyads
of kin and non-kin individuals, and dyads of same and different-
sexed individuals. Note that at this age, the first social bonds form
among ravens, but these are still strongly affected by kin relations
(Braun and Bugnyar, 2012; Loretto et al., 2012). Subjects and their
partners remained the same throughout the experiment, and to
avoid reciprocity never changed roles. However, each subject did
serve as a partner for a different individual other than his or her
own partner (for actual subject-partner dyads see Table 1).
Subjects (and their partners) were tested in two adjacent test
compartments that were separated by wire mesh. Each bird
was tested as subject 4 times in all 4 different conditions (test
condition, social control condition, non-social control condition,
and motivation control condition; Figure 1); i.e., 16 times in
TABLE 1 | Name of subject and partner, sex and rank of subject, and the total number of transfers and subsequent exchanges by the partner
(transfers/exchanges) in the 4 different conditions.
Subject Partner Sex Rank Total # of transfers/exchanges
Test Social control Non-social control Motivation control*
Laggie Tom m 1 0/- 0 5 0/40
Tom Paul m 2 0/- 0 0 0/40
Paul Adele m 6 10/9 1 5 0/40
Horst George m 4 0/- 2 2 0/38
George Nobel m 3 1/1 0 0 0/40
Louise Horst f 9 5/5 2 1 0/40
Nobel Laggie f 8 0/- 0 0 0/40
Adele Louise f 10 0/- 0 0 0/40
*Exchanges performed by the subject itself.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 885
Massen et al. Raven pro-sociality
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the different conditions in which the birds were tested in experiment 1. (A) Test condition; (B) Non-Social Control
condition; (C) Social Control condition; (D) Motivation Control condition.
total. The order of conditions was semi-randomized such that
each individual went through 4 subsequent runs of all four
conditions, each run starting with a different condition. The
subject and partner’s position in a condition in either the right or
left testing compartment was counterbalanced for each individual
over the 4 repetitions. Neither subjects nor their partners were
tested more than once per day.
Test condition (Figure 1A)
At the start of the test condition, the subject received 10
tokens (which were casted into the test compartment by the
experimenter). However, the subject did not have the opportunity
to exchange the tokens with the experimenter, since the red table
(where they were trained to exchange) was placed in front of
the adjacent test compartment where the partner was present.
If the subject transferred a token to its partner through the
wire mesh, the partner could subsequently exchange the token
with the experimenter. If this chain of events occurred, only the
(exchanging) partner would be rewarded with a piece (1/8th)
of a dog biscuit (frolic R©) and verbal praise. Consequently, the
transfer of a token from the subject to the partner was considered
a “prosocial” act.
Non-social control condition (Figure 1B)
To test whether prosocial acts were not due to an attempt to bring
the tokens as close to the red table as possible, we performed a
non-social control condition. This condition was similar to the
test condition, however, without a partner present in the adjacent
cage.
Social Control Condition (Figure 1C)
To test whether prosocial acts were not due to an attempt
to object play, where two ravens play with the same object
simultaneously (Heinrich, 1999), we performed a social control
condition. This condition was similar to the test condition,
however, the red table was not present at all, and both subject and
partner had no opportunity to exchange tokens in this condition.
Motivation control condition (Figure 1D)
Since the subjects were not able to gain any rewards in either of
the above-mentioned conditions, we also performed amotivation
control condition. This condition was added to test- and both
control conditions to both keep the subjects motivated and to test
for general motivation. The motivation control condition was the
same as the test condition, however, the red table was placed in
front of the compartment of the subject instead of in front of the
partner’s compartment, thereby allowing the subject to exchange
all 10 tokens it was provided with.Whenever, a subject exchanged
a token it received a piece (1/8th) of a dog biscuit (frolic R©) and
verbal praise.
Each condition lasted until the 10 tokens were transferred or
exchanged, or until a maximum of 10min. The experiments were
recorded using two Canon LEGRIA R© HD-camcorders.
Experiment 2
For Experiment 2 the group’s home aviary was split into three
compartments: two large compartments (each 6 × 15× 5m) on
the outsides and one smaller compartment (3 × 5× 5m) in the
middle, all separated by wire mesh. During testing the subject was
always in the middle compartment, whereas the rest of the group
(the remaining 9 birds) was either in the compartment to the
left or to the right of the subject. Each bird was tested as subject
2 times in all 4 different conditions (non-costly “prosociality”
test condition, social control condition, costly “prosociality” test
condition, costly “prosociality” control condition; Figure 2); i.e.,
8 times in total. The order of conditions was semi-randomized;
i.e., 2 subsequent runs of all four conditions were carried out
per individual; each run started with a different condition,
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the different conditions in which the birds were tested in experiment 2: (A) Test condition; (B) Social Control
condition; (C) “Costly Prosociality” Test condition; (D) “Costly Prosociality” Control condition.
and the different orders were pseudo-randomized across the 8
individuals. Also the position of the group, i.e., either to the left
or to the right of the subject’s compartment, was counterbalanced
across the 8 individuals, and was counterbalanced per individual
over the 2 repetitions. Subjects were tested only once per day.
Test condition (Figure 2A)
At the start of the test condition, the subject received 15 tokens
(i.e., were casted into the test/middle compartment by the
experimenter). However, the subject did not have the opportunity
to exchange the tokens with the experimenter, since both red
tables were placed in front of the adjacent compartments:
one in which the group was present, one that was empty. If
the subject transferred a token through the wire mesh to the
compartment in which the group was present, a group member
could subsequently exchange the token with the experimenter. If
this chain of events occurred, only the (exchanging) individual
would be rewarded with a piece (1/8th) of a dog biscuit (frolic R©)
and verbal praise. Consequently, the transfer of a token from
subject to a groupmember was considered a “prosocial” act. Note
that the red table in front of the empty compartment in this
condition functions as a non-social control (cf. non-social control
condition of Experiment 1).
Social control condition (Figure 2B)
To test whether prosocial acts were not due to an attempt to
object play, like in Experiment 1, we performed a social control
condition. This condition was similar to the test condition,
although, no red tables were present, and both subject and its
group members had no opportunity to exchange tokens in this
condition.
Costly prosociality test condition (Figure 2C)
To test whether, if the ravens would be prosocial in the Test
condition, they would also forego a reward for themselves to
provide their group members with a reward, we performed a
costly prosociality condition. In this condition, the subject could
exchange all 15 tokens, or transfer them to the compartments
in which its groupmembers were, where they could subsequently
exchange the tokens themselves. The latter would be considered
as a “costly prosocial act.”
Costly prosociality control condition (Figure 2D)
To test whether costly prosocial acts were not due to an
attempt to object play, or due to an attempt to bring the
tokens as close to the other red table as possible, we performed
the costly prosociality control condition. In this condition,
similar to the costly prosociality test condition, the subject
could choose to exchange all 15 tokens itself, transfer it to
an empty compartment that had a red table in front of it
(cf. non-social control condition of Experiment 1), or to the
compartment were the group was present, which however did
not have a red table in front of it (cf. social control condition of
Experiment 1).
As in Experiment 1, each condition lasted until all tokens
were transferred or exchanged, or until a maximum of 10min,
and all experiments were recorded using two Canon LEGRIA R©
HD-camcorders. In Experiment 2 we needed two experimenters.
Both experimenters took their position behind a red table (Test-,
Costly Prosociality Test-, and Costly Prosociality Control-
Condition) immediately after the tokens were casted into the
subject compartment. They changed their position after 5min, if
the session lasted as long. Experimenters starting position; i.e.,
either behind the left or the right red table, was counterbalanced
across the 8 individuals, and was counterbalanced per
individual over the 2 repetitions. Both experimenters were
also present during the Social Control condition at a distance of
about 1.5m.
Behavioral Data
Dominance rank data were deduced from monopolization
experiments conducted during the corresponding time periods
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TABLE 2 | Name, sex and rank of subject, and the total number of transfers to the group and subsequent exchanges by a group member (transfers
group/exchanges) in the 4 different conditions.
Subject Sex Rank Total # of transfers/exchanges
Test Social control “Costly Prosociality” test* “Costly Prosociality” control*
Laggie m 1 0/- 0/0 0/19 0/30
Tom m 2 0/- 0/0 0/30 0/26
Paul m 3 2/1 0/0 0/30 0/15
Horst m 5 0/- 0/0 0/30 0/30
George m 4 0/- 1/0 0/30 0/15
Louise f 7 0/- 0/0 0/30 0/30
Nobel f 8 0/- 0/0 0/30 0/30
Adele f 10 0/- 0/0 0/30 0/29
*Exchanges performed by the subject itself.
of both experiments (3 monopolization experiments per
experimental period). In these monopolization experiments the
study group was provided with two large pieces of partly frozen
meat, which are highly valuable and easily monopolized. For
half an hour per experiment we recorded all displacements and
arranged these in a matrix with actors in rows and recipients
in columns. Using MatMan (version 1.1; de Vries et al., 1993),
we calculated Landau’s linearity indices (h’) and reordered the
matrix to best fit a linear hierarchy (de Vries, 1995, 1998).
We found a significantly linear hierarchy in both study periods
(2013/Experiment 1: h′ = 0.788, n = 10, p = 0.0024, based
on 321 interactions and with 20% of unknown relationships,
see Table 1; 2014/Experiment 2: h′ = 0.709, n = 10, p =
0.0033, based on 528 interactions and with 16.56% of unknown
relationships, see Table 2) with several rank changes between the
two different periods.
Since ravens readily cache/hide food and non-food items
(Bugnyar and Kotrschal, 2002) we coded if and howmany tokens
each individual cached per condition.
Finally, the behavior of the partners (Experiment 1) and the
rest of the group (Experiment 2) in the tests was coded from
the videotapes and categorized as (a) interest (i.e., the time an
individual spent in front of the wire mesh separation), and (b)
attention-getting behaviors (i.e., all vocalizations and pecking at
any object that creates a sound).
Analysis
Choices were coded live by JJMM and recoded from the
videos by ML. Inter-rater reliability was perfect (Cohen’s
kappa= 1).
To assess whether the ravens in our study were prosocial,
we compared the number of tokens they transferred from their
own compartment to that of their partner(s) in the test and
control conditions using Friedman tests, and performing post-
hoc Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. Similarly, partner behavior was
compared between conditions usingWilcoxon signed ranks tests.
Comparisons on an individual level were calculated using Chi
squared tests with Yates correction. All analyses were performed
in IBM SPSS Statistics v.20 for Mac OS, with α set to 0.05. All
reported p-values are 2-tailed.
FIGURE 3 | Median ± Quartiles and 95% confidence intervals of the
number of tokens transferred from subject to partner in Test-, Social
Control, and Non-Social Control Condition.
Results
Experiment 1
All ravens were very motivated to participate in Experiment 1. In
themotivation control sessions each raven exchanged (almost) all
tokens (Mean total = 39.75 ± S.E. 0.25 out of 40; Table 1), and
in general exchanged the 10 tokens per session in less than 2min
(Mean time necessary to exchange the 10 tokens per session =
109.3 s± S.E. 15 s).
Overall, the ravens were not prosocial; i.e., we did not find a
significant difference in the amount of token transfers between
the test condition and the two control conditions (Friedman
test: χ2 = 1.06, n = 8, p = 0.589; Figure 3). Nevertheless,
three individuals did spontaneously transfer tokens in the test
condition (see Table 1), and one did so significantly more so
than in the control conditions (Paul: Yates χ2 = 4.06, df = 1,
p = 0.049; Table 1 and Supplementary Video 1). Specifically,
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Paul performed significantly more token transfers in the test
condition than in the social control condition (Yates χ2 = 6.75,
df = 1, p = 0.009), but not compared to the non-social control
condition (Yates χ2 = 1.31, df = 1, p = 0.25).
Rather than transferring tokens to a partner, if the birds were
not able to exchange their tokens themselves, they cached about
half of the tokens they were provided with in the sand (Mean ±
S.E. = 18.63 ± 1.19 out of 40), irrespective of the condition they
were in (Friedman test: χ2: 2.00, n = 8, p = 0.368).
Regarding partner behavior, we found no evidence for
partners paying more attention to the subjects in the test
condition than in the social control condition; if anything,
there was a non-significant trend that they paid less attention
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T+ = 31.0, n = 8, p = 0.069),
most likely because they were distracted by the experimenter
sitting in front of them during the test condition. Similarly,
partners did not show a significant difference in the amount of
attention-getting behaviors between the test and social control
condition (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T+ = 26.0, n = 8,
p = 0.26).
Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1, all ravens were very motivated to participate
in Experiment 2.Whenever they had the opportunity to exchange
tokens themselves (i.e., in conditions C and D, see Figure 2),
they exchanged almost all of them with the experimenter (Mean
total = 27.13 ± S.E. 1.38 out of 30; Table 2) and in general
exchanged the 15 tokens per session in about 4min (Mean time
necessary to exchange the 15 tokens per session = 242 s ± S.E.
32.5 s). None of the birds transferred a token to any of their
group members in these “costly prosociality” conditions, and
only 1 bird did so in the “normal” prosocial test condition (2
tokens), whereas 1 bird transferred one token in the social control
condition (Table 2). Consequently, there was no significant
difference in the number of tokens transferred between the
different conditions (Friedman test: χ2 = 2.00, n = 8, p =
0.572). Interestingly, however, the one bird that did transfer
tokens in a test condition in Experiment 2 (Paul), was the
same bird that did transfer most tokens in the test condition of
Experiment 1.
Similar to Experiment 1, whenever the birds could not
exchange the tokens themselves, they cached about half of all
tokens in the sand (Mean ± S.E. = 13.75 ± 1.98 out of 30),
irrespective of the condition they were in (Friedman test: χ2:
2.00, n = 8, p = 0.368).
Regarding partner behavior, we found no evidence for the
group paying more attention to the subjects in the test conditions
than in control conditions; i.e., there was no difference in the
amount of birds that spent time in front of the wire mesh between
the test compartments (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T+ = 4.5,
n = 8, p = 0.206), nor in the amount of time they spent nearby
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T+ = 10, n = 8, p = 0.263).
Similarly, partners did not show a significant difference in the
amount of attention-getting behaviors between the test and social
control conditions (Wilcoxon signed ranks test: T+ = 21.0, n =
8, p = 0.674).
Discussion
Our results show that in our experimental set-ups subadult
ravens do not regularly help their conspecifics to gain access to
food. Given these results, in accordance with Di Lascio et al.
(2013), we cannot conclude that ravens are prosocial, at least
during the first years of their life. This is in apparent contrast
to what has been reported for several primate species (reviewed
in Cronin, 2012; but see also Amici et al., 2014) and for closely
related jackdaws (Schwab et al., 2012; for a review on all these
species see Cronin, 2012).
The discrepancy between the two corvid species may be due to
different socio-ecological evolutionary pressures like for example
the different breeding systems of jackdaws and ravens. Whereas,
raven pairs breed in large territories (Heinrich, 1999), jackdaw
pairs breed in colonies, and their subsequent higher intraspecific
tolerance and dependence on each other regarding nest defense
against predators (Johnsson, 1994), may have led to the evolution
of prosociality in the jackdaws only (cf. Burkart et al., 2014).
However, non-breeding ravens, like the ones we tested here, are
known to congregate in large, highly social flocks, show high
intraspecific tolerance, and even form strong and stable social
bonds (not only with future pair-mates) (Fraser and Bugnyar,
2010). Comparative work on various corvid species with varying
degrees of allo-parental care should, however, elucidate whether
the observed pattern is a general one that corroborates the
cooperative breeding/alloparental care hypothesis (Burkart et al.,
2007, 2014). In addition, the discrepancy between the two corvid
species may also be due to other ecological differences between
the species. For example, jackdaws do not cache food, whereas
ravens regularly do (de Kort and Clayton, 2006), and in this
paradigm also had the opportunity to do so with the valuable
tokens.
Moreover, there may be several other reasons why the ravens
in these experiments did not take the opportunity to help
their conspecifics to gain access to food. First, the ravens in
these experiments might not have understood the paradigms
sufficiently. While the birds were adept at moving between the
two compartments to exchange tokens themselves, they had no
prior experience exchanging tokens with or transferring tokens
to conspecifics. Alternatively, in the test conditions the ravens
may have expected to be able to exchange tokens themselves at
a later point in time, which would explain their caching behavior
in those conditions, or they could not inhibit the urge to cache in
these conditions. Insufficient understanding of the task at hand
has also been suggested to explain why chimpanzees did not
help others, while human children did so in a similar helping
paradigm (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006). In support of this
explanation, we did observe, albeit sporadically, that during the
test conditions and during the different control conditions some
of our birds did push tokens through the wire mesh on the
side of the experimenter, as to exchange the token with the
experimenter, although neither the appropriate red table nor the
experimenter were present there (see Figures 1, 2). Additionally,
partners also did not show more interest in the subjects, nor
tried to get their attention more in conditions where they
could exchange a token than in conditions in which they did
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not have such opportunity. Alternatively, this hypothesis would
predict that if given some experience with the characteristics
and possible outcomes of the set-up, the ravens might have
become more prosocial. However, although two of the three
ravens that did transfer some tokens to their partners in two
consecutive test-sessions of Experiment 1, they ceased to do so
in the following test-session. Nevertheless, it was one of these
ravens that also transferred tokens to the group in the test-
condition of Experiment 2, albeit at a non-significant level, which
might support the hypothesis and suggests that this individual
was the only one that had some understanding of the task at
hand.
Second, the unequal reward distribution between partner and
subject (i.e., only the partner would receive a reward), might
have inhibited subjects to be prosocial already at the start of
the study, and might have caused individuals that did try to
exchange tokens to cease this behavior when they discovered
there is nothing to gain for themselves. Ravens are sensitive to
disadvantageous inequity (Wascher and Bugnyar, 2013), and this
inequity aversion may have competed with prosocial preferences
(Brosnan et al., 2010; Cronin, 2012). For example, in capuchin
monkeys it has been shown that a disadvantageous reward
distribution for the actor in comparison to its partner (0/1)
does reduce prosocial preferences in comparison to a set-up in
which the actor and the partner are rewarded equally (1/1) for
a prosocial choice of the actor (Brosnan et al., 2010). Similarly,
long-tailed macaques were shown to be prosocial toward kin at
no cost to themselves (Massen et al., 2010), yet did not choose
to be prosocial toward their kin when this choice forces them
to forgo a high-quality reward (Sterck et al., 2015). Therefore, it
would be very interesting to see how ravens would behave in a 1/1
prosocial choice task.
Although the ravens in our experiment were not prosocial
in general, acts of prosocial helping did spontaneously occur,
albeit very little and not always significantly more than in the
control conditions. The few isolated cases we report here do not
allow us to analyze effects of the identity of the tested individual
(cf. Massen et al., 2010) and the composition of the dyad (cf.
Massen et al., 2011) on prosociality. Especially since only one
individual showed consistent helping in both the dyadic and
group experiment, though not more than the control conditions
in the group experiments and only significantly more than
one (out of two) control conditions in the dyadic experiment,
hypotheses about underlying motivations are highly speculative.
As mentioned above, it could be that only this individual
understood the task at hand. Alternatively, since he was paired
with a female, it might be that this individual was trying to form
a pair bond with the female through behaving prosocially toward
her. This would correspond to his developmental stage (Braun
and Bugnyar, 2012) and also to the results found in jackdaws,
where more cooperative acts were reported for mixed-sex pairs
than for same-sex pairs (Schwab et al., 2012). However, this was
not the only mixed-sex pair we tested, further, this subject also
transferred tokens, albeit only 2, to other males in the group test
of Experiment 2. Nevertheless, it may be particularly interesting
to test also adult ravens in our set-up, as the interdependence
of the monogamous pair-bond (Braun and Bugnyar, 2012) may
facilitate prosocial tendencies among the birds. Finally, it is
interesting to note that the one bird that consistently transferred
tokens to conspecifics was relatively weakly integrated in the
group (unpublished data). It may be that through behaving
prosocially he was trying to become better integrated, much like
primates groom up the hierarchy for tolerance (Seyfarth, 1977;
von Bayern et al., 2007).
In our set-up, we chose to avoid the possibility to immediately
reciprocate, in order to test true prosocial preferences; i.e.,
without the possibility of an immediate return of the investment.
However, it remains interesting what would have happened if we
had allowed the ravens to reciprocate. For example, in basically
the same set-up, though with the ability to reciprocate, Pelé
et al. (2009) showed that in contrast to our ravens, bonobos, and
orang-utans did frequently transfer tokens, whereas, similar to
our ravens, chimpanzees and gorillas rarely did (Pelé et al., 2009).
Moreover, the transfers of two particular orangutans seemed to
be calculated (Dufour et al., 2009; but see Pelé et al., 2009).
Similarly, Norway rats rely on obtained benefits to adjust the
level of help they return reciprocally (Dolivo and Taborsky,
2015), although it has also recently been shown that Norway
rats can show spontaneous prosociality (Hernandez-Lallement
et al., 2015). In addition, modeling studies (e.g., Gintis et al.,
2003; Forber and Smead, 2014) suggest that in combination
with a sense of fairness, a trait recently reported to exist in
ravens (Wascher and Bugnyar, 2013), through reciprocity even
the sporadic acts of helping reported in this study might lead
to cooperation on the scale ravens display in their natural lives
(e.g., Fraser and Bugnyar, 2012; but see Cronin et al., 2010).
The evolution of spite, in turn, even enhances the evolution
of cooperation through fairness (Gintis et al., 2003; Jensen,
2010; Forber and Smead, 2014). So far, however, there is no
experimental data supporting the notion of functional spite in
non-human animals, suggesting a distinction between humans
and non-human animals that may explain human “hyper-
cooperativeness” (Jensen, 2010).
In contrast to other studies (e.g., Horner et al., 2011; Schwab
et al., 2012) that showed that the behavior of the partner could
predict whether an actor was prosocial or not, our data do not
support such a notion. Similarly, we did not find any effect of
the identity of the subject or of the characteristics of the tested
dyad, as was shown in long-tailedmacaques, for example (Massen
et al., 2010, 2011). However, given the scarcity of prosocial acts
in our results, and consequently little variation in prosociality
among our birds, we feel that we cannot draw any conclusions
from abovementioned null-results.
In sum, we showed that in a helping set-up sub-adult
ravens do not consistently exhibit prosocial preferences. Future
research should illuminate whether this absence reflects an
evolutionary deviation from the closely related jackdaws, and
from the more distant primate species in which prosociality
has been revealed experimentally, or whether the difficulty
of the task at hand and the unequal reward distribution for
the actor may have inhibited existing prosocial preferences
among the ravens. Nevertheless, we showed that prosocial
helping can occur spontaneously in ravens, and we suggest
that even these sporadic instances, in combination with a
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sense of fairness, might lead to stable cooperation in this
species.
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